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Political Leadership in South Korea’s Developmental 
State: A Historical Revisit 
 
Ratu Ayu Asih Kusuma Putri  Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia 
Abstract 
South Korea under President Park Chung Hee underwent rapid industrialization and 
experienced phenomenal economic growth making the country one of the Asian Tigers 
alongside Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Had suffered by the long-standing 
Japanese colonialization, South Korea’s development strategies in its incipient economic 
venture, interestingly, postulate unforeseen similarities with those imposed by Japan 
primarily during the phenomenal industrial revolution of the Meiji government (1868-
1912). Exponential modernization in South Korea was substantially forged by the 
implementation of ‘developmental state’ model. The term was initially coined by Johnson 
(1982) to explain the pacification of government policies – rather than market – to achieve 
successful economic rejuvenation of post-war Japan. In light to this historical paradox 
between South Korea and Japan, this article attempts to revisit the embarking point of 
South Korea’s rapid economic development beginning in the 1960s by drawing attention 
to the importance of leadership as one of the major components of the developmental state 
model. It concludes that Park Chung Hee’s strong Japanese linkage combined with his 
pretext for imposing ‘hard authoritarianism’ is particularly influential in determining 
South Korea’s pragmatic development trajectory. 
Key words: developmental state, South Korea, Park Chung Hee, modernization, 
leadership 
 
Introduction 
The behind-the-scenes animosity 
of South Koreans to Japan is inevitable. 
Despite the shared cultural heritage and 
close geographic positions, some 
unpleasant contacts since the ancient 
period culminated during the annexation 
of Korea in 1910 emotionally afflicted the 
two countries’ view of each other and led 
to a prevailing sense of rivalry even until 
today. The harsh colonial rule, 
‘Japanization’ policy, and ruthless 
exploitation of Koreans by the Japanese 
had consequently built a deep hatred 
amongst Koreans toward Japan. 
Conversely, as Lee (1985) points out that 
most Japanese are disdainful and 
intolerant of Korea, do not understand 
and are insensitive to the feelings of 
Koreans, and do not wish to be involved 
with anything related to Korea, unless, 
there are rational reasons for doing so. 
Although there has been a significant shift 
toward the much better relationship 
between the two, these emotions are not 
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easily extinguished especially amongst the 
old generation and the more conservative 
population. Japanese and Korean can form 
lasting friendships and working 
relationships at the individual level, yet 
there is no sense of genuine friendship at 
the collective or societal level. 
Despite the bitter relationship, 
South Korea’s successful development 
policies in the 1960s demonstrate striking 
similarities with those imposed by Japan 
during the Meiji’s industrial revolution 
and Japan’s post-war economic 
renaissance. Once pronounced as one of 
the poorest countries in the world after 
suffering from the devastating Korean 
War, South Korea emerged as a global 
economic power in a relatively short 
period. Albeit being on the American side, 
South Korea demarcated from the market-
based liberal economy and instead 
imposed an ‘interventionist state pattern’ 
to boost its economy, a pattern first 
instituted by the Meiji government during 
the industrial revolution in Japan (Kim & 
Jaffe, 2010). The pattern demonstrates a 
state-centric development or state-driven 
economic growth in which state utilizes its 
effective control of the national economy 
to pursue their global economic interests 
(Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Tønnesson, 
2017). The pattern distinguishes the East 
Asian model of development in 
comparison to the Western model that 
supports minimization of state 
intervention. 
In the early stage of its rapid 
economic expansion, South Korea 
emulated the ‘developmental state’ model, 
pioneered by Japan, to a significant 
degree. In addition to placing the 
centralized state as the engine powering 
the industrialization, most notable 
similarities can be seen on the prominence 
of military power to ensure internal and 
external stability; its focus on heavy and 
chemical industries; and the interlocking 
relations between the state and the 
business groups (chaebol, similar to Japan’s 
zaibatsu) that were given incentives by the 
government to develop industry deemed 
vital to development and state’s interests. 
South Korea’s economic take-off began 
during Park Chung-hee’s rule (1961 – 
1979) after a military coup he initiated 
against Chang Myon’s administration. 
Immediately after assuming power, Park 
imposed some policies oriented to the goal 
of rapid industrialization such as the 
nationalization of country’s financial 
assets, including the banking system; and 
the acceleration of foreign loans inflow to 
the chaebol with both the principle and 
interest were guaranteed by the 
government (Minns, 2001).  
Park’s administration had 
significantly been inspired by the Meiji 
government’s principle of “rich state and 
strong army policy” (fukoku kyohei). In the 
early 1970s, Park shifted its industrial 
emphasis from light manufacturing 
towards heavy and chemical industries. 
The shift was exponentially driven by the 
US retrenchment post-Vietnam War and 
its détente with the Soviet Union that 
consequently decreased its reliability. Park 
imposed the Heavy and Chemical 
Industry Plan (HCIP) to provide the 
capability for self-defense and focus on 
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the production of steel, petrochemicals, 
electronics, and shipbuilding (Minns, 
2001). To ensure internal stability, the 
regime ensured order and stability 
through a nationally organized and 
centrally responsive police and 
intelligence structures as instruments of 
rule (Cumings, 1984). Opposition parties 
were effectively banned during the 
Fourth, and Fifth Republics and their 
leaders were subjected to harsh treatment, 
including imprisonment. Any opposition 
should be suppressed to keep the whole 
aspects of state under its control. 
Moreover, control over the media has 
been stern (Eckert, 1991). On the other 
words, Park defaulted on the Western 
bloc’s most cherished ideas of free 
elections, liberal democracy, fundamental 
human and political rights. The South 
Korean modernization is characterized by 
particularly acute tensions and 
discrepancies between effective strategies 
of development and ideological hypocrisy 
(Kim K., 2006). The U.S. approach of 
supporting the Global South’s 
undemocratic and authoritarian regimes 
during the Cold War, nevertheless, was 
common and unsurprising. The need to 
contain the spread of communism became 
the strategic imperative to tolerate the 
atrocious rule of such regimes and to 
justify their postwar economic 
reconstruction effort (Wong, 2004). In 
turn, these regimes accommodate the 
United States to gain benefits from aid, 
investments, and market access and 
eschew from becoming targets of its 
hostility (Tønnesson, 2017).  
Against this backdrop, this article 
aims to elucidate the historical paradox 
between South Korea and Japan through a 
micro-analysis of political leadership 
focusing on the role of Park Chung Hee as 
the developmental state elite. In the next 
section, I will elaborate on the 
developmental state model and how the 
role of political leadership is prominent 
when applying the model. The sections 
thereafter will explain the features of the 
Japanese developmental state model 
particularly during the Meiji restoration 
and the ‘presumed’ Japanese legacies 
prevalent to South Korea’s subsequent 
development. Lastly, this article will 
explore the role of Park Chung Hee in 
actualizing the Japanese developmental 
state formula to South Korea by reflecting 
on his personal and professional ties with 
Japan. 
Developmental State Model: The central 
role of political leadership 
Many observers illustrate the 
successful modernization process in some 
countries in East Asia using the 
developmental state paradigm. The term 
developmental state is coined by 
Chalmers Johnson (1982) in his seminal 
work on Japan’s post-war development.  
The Japanese formula has been described 
as ‘plan rational state’ or ‘plan-oriented 
market economy’ to substantially 
elucidate the intimate relationship of state 
with the private sector and the intensity of 
its involvement in the market (Johnson, 
1982). Beeson (2009) posits that unlike 
“market rational” state that concerns with 
simply establishing the rules of the 
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economic game, the “plan rational” states 
sought to formulate and pursue 
substantive social and economic goals. A 
developmental state model is defined by 
some significant components which 
include a determined developmental elite 
who effectively conceives executive 
dominance, creates bureaucratic unity, 
and a powerful, competent and insulated 
economic bureaucracy; selective and 
strategic use of resources and instruments; 
the effective management of non-state 
economic interests; and the use of 
repression, legitimacy and performance 
which in corollary sustain a weak and 
subordinated civil society (Johnson, 1982; 
Amsden, 1989; Haggard, Kim, & Moon, 
1991; Leftwich 1995; Tønnesson 2017). A 
developmental state is also characterized 
by the path dependency, institutional 
cohesion and the interlocking patterns of 
political and economic power that are 
such a ubiquitous and distinctive part of 
development in East Asia (Beeson, 2009).  
The core component of the 
developmental state is political leadership 
that accentuates executive dominance and 
embodies determined developmental elite. 
A developmental state has to be governed 
by determined and economically oriented 
elite. Political leadership is central in 
choosing and realigning economic policies 
by political rationality and ‘developmental 
ideology’ (Johnson 1989; Amsden, 1989; 
Moon & Prasad, 1994). Leader’s 
motivations and calculations are the vital 
clues to priority shift and policy change 
that usually require a perceived crisis 
among the population and for the new 
priorities to resonate with the emotional 
needs of public opinion (Moon & Prasad, 
1994; Tønnesson, 2017). Sakata & Hall 
(1965) on their study about Meiji 
Restoration argue that study of the 
motives of the political leaders is a 
formidable task to explain the figures who 
were to lead the way in the creation of a 
new structure of state and society. 
Leadership style, therefore, determines 
how the executive dominance in a 
developmental state is being enforced 
(reigning vs. ruling). Amsden (1989) 
suggests the importance of ‘learning’ 
rather than invention or innovation as the 
basis of industrialization which is relevant 
to the context of South Korea. 
Manufactures were initially developed 
and competed from borrowed technology 
which later optimized. They created 
products similar to those internationally 
available but with improvements in the 
specification and lower price thus enhance 
competitiveness (Amsden, 1989).  
Other incremental features of 
determined developmental elites include 
the intimate linkage of their civil and 
military bureaucracy and high political 
components; and the strong patron-client 
relations that eventually prompted the 
practice of corruption, technocratic 
economic management, patrimonialism, 
and coercion. Leftwich (1995) further 
asserts the importance of the executive 
head of government who plays an 
instrumental role in establishing the 
developmental regime and its culture. 
Moon & Prasad (1994) examines the 
bureaucratic-executive nexus in the 
countries where executive dominance 
prevails. They posit that in such case, 
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policymaking is profoundly top-down, 
and bureaucrats hardly have autonomy 
and power. For instance, South Korea 
during Park Chung Hee regime, the nexus 
was rigidly vertical in which the President 
controls the concentration of 
administrative and personnel power. 
Korean bureaucrats were structurally 
dependent on and vulnerable to the 
President (Moon & Prasad, 1994). In the 
East Asian context particularly during the 
Cold War, the emergence of ‘hard 
authoritarian’ regimes were the common 
historical precondition for developmental 
state model to take place. Hard 
authoritarian regimes penetrate and 
prevail over civil society, and organized, 
subsidized, and controlled social groups 
(Moon & Prasad, 1994). Most of such 
regimes in East Asia commonly obtained 
their political source of the relative state 
autonomy through military coup d’état or 
forced transmission of state power 
(Leftwich, 1995). Traditionally, 
developmental regimes use the historical 
mission to deter communist forces to 
justify their concentration of power and 
nondemocratic practices hence legitimate 
the state’s intervention in a wide array of 
civil society’s activities. 
The Unbroken Lineage between South 
Korean and Japanese Developmental 
State? 
This section will examine the 
features of the Japanese developmental 
state model notably that implemented 
during the Meiji Era, and the Japanese 
colonial legacies which presumably had 
laid a necessary foundation for South 
Korea’s development. The locus of this 
study is Meiji restoration, and the 
subsequent modernization of Japan as the 
foundational establishment of the 
Japanese developmental state model 
occurred during the period. Even the 
Japanese post-World War II economic 
development indicated a replication of the 
reform formula of Japan’s Meiji era 
(Tønnesson, 2017). 
Distinctive Features of Japanese 
Developmental State Model in the Meiji Era 
(1868-1912) 
What makes the Japanese 
development model – particularly that of 
the Meiji era – different from the Western 
model? The Japanese model of 
development is recognized as the 
developmental state system where the 
state has dominant control over economic 
development. The government 
involvement in economic affairs is 
following ‘the command and control’ 
mode. The command and control mode 
demonstrate the extent of the military 
organizations’ reliance on the hierarchy 
and direct commands as well as central 
planning in which bureaucrats set 
production targets and quotas for farms 
and manufacturing firms (Mosk, 2008). At 
an early stage of its industrial 
development Japan was so poorly 
endowed by raw materials to support 
industrialization. The strategy to 
overcome this was to become an exporter 
of industrial goods to ensure foreign 
exchange availability which can be used to 
import raw material and to meet the cost 
of imported technology and expertise 
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required to ‘catch up’ with other 
industrial countries (Breen, 1997).  
The Japanese model of 
development can be understood by 
observing the historical, political and 
social aspects that establish the distinctive 
features of this model. The Japanese 
unprecedented rapid development was 
led by the Meiji Restoration (Meiji Ishin) 
starting in 1868 through the restoration of 
the imperial rule in Japan. Some historians 
argue that the breakdown of feudal 
economy and weakening defense 
capability during the late period 
Tokugawa had led to the increased threat 
of foreign invasion by the Western powers 
and caused widespread resentment 
against the shogunate (Sakata & Hall, 
1956). The restoration was trademarked as 
a ‘revolution from above’ to modernize 
and maintain independence from a 
threatening West. After the coup which 
ended the Tokugawa rule, the Meiji 
oligarch leaders, consisting of those from 
Satsuma and Chōsū, launched a rapid 
program of industrialization emphasizing 
economic development as the key of 
security and to escape the country from 
backwardness (Ginsburg, 2001).  The 
Restoration led to enormous changes in 
Japan’s political and social structure 
which marked as the starting point of 
Japanese modernization. It created an 
immensely powerful central government; 
abolished warrior privileges and open the 
administration office to anyone with the 
required education and skills; and 
instituted a compulsory military service 
system and universal public education to 
all people (Mosk, 2008).  
Meiji restoration has some 
distinctive features in its way of 
modernizing Japan. First, the most crucial 
element of the Meiji period was the 
principle of fukoku kyohei (enrich the 
country, strengthen the military) which 
explicitly aimed at absorbing Western 
technology and institutions in political, 
economic and military affairs with the 
ultimate aim of resisting the pressure of 
and subsequently repelling the Western 
power (Mosk, 2008). Macpherson (1987) 
posits that this xenophobic nationalism 
apparently dictated Meiji’s rapid 
industrialization. As the industrialization 
became an economic underpinning of 
military power, the state particularly 
encouraged the import – then followed by 
the production – of indigenous technology 
and industry in fields such as steel, 
machine tools and shipbuilding 
(Alexander, 2008). Japan began to adopt 
the Western military technology, build 
arsenals and shipyards, establish technical 
schools, and invite foreign military 
advisers (Hacker, 1977). While internally, 
the politics of the early Meiji period were 
dominated by the need to extinguish 
domestic opposition particularly by the 
disgruntled samurai. Until domestic 
unrest could be squished, it would be 
difficult for the government’s authority to 
effectively institute policy and force the 
public to comply with it.  
Secondly, one of the corollaries of 
fukoku kyohei was the shokusan kogyo 
(encourage the manufacture and promote 
industry) led to the emergence of zaibatsu 
in Japan. It demonstrates a close 
interaction between government and 
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manufacturing as well as between 
economic policy and industrial 
development. The government at all levels 
should assist industry by coordinating it, 
by taking a long view of development 
rather than the short-run emphasis on 
making annual profits characteristic of 
decentralized “invisible hand” capitalism, 
that can appreciate the input-output 
connections between different sub-sectors 
of manufacturing (Mosk, 2008). They see 
that the manifestation of shokusan kogyo 
could be achieved through the emergence 
of zaibatsu and the financial groups who 
controlled diversified economic empires, 
ranging from banking to insurance to 
international trade to textiles to iron and 
steel to shipbuilding to iron and steel 
manufacture. Through these strategies 
formulated by the Meiji oligarchs, Japan 
jumped rapidly into the phase of capital 
monopoly. On the other hand, Mosk 
(2008) argues that this strategy had a 
detrimental consequence to the emergence 
of a military-bureaucratic class who 
monopolizes capital in the form of the 
zaibatsu operating hand in glove with the 
authorities. The nation was hijacked by a 
tiny elite consisting of influential 
militarists and capitalists taking 
advantages from the government absolute 
power over the economy. The Japanese 
system is unique due to this compact 
system of networks between state 
agencies, and business firms coined as 
‘crony capitalism’ which portray collusion 
between all parties rather than 
competition. Furthermore, in Japan’s case, 
the state possesses the strength to 
penetrate and mobilize the society using 
the development narrative (Evans, 1995). 
This relative autonomy, as Evans (1995) 
described, includes bureaucratic agencies 
that were not only capable and coherent 
but also manipulation of the society and 
close ties with the economic actors who in 
turn support the policy implementation 
and the ‘guided’ development.  
Presumption of ‘Japanese Colonial Legacies’ 
There is still an ongoing debate 
amongst Koreans – and scholars – about 
the Japanese colonial legacies on Korean 
development. Some argue that the 
Japanese colonization transformed Korea 
into a developmental state through the 
production-oriented policy and 
establishing a business-government 
alliance that facilitated industrialization 
(Kohli 1994; Kohli 1997; Kohli 2004; 
Cumings 1984). The colonial economy 
experienced steady growth and 
industrialization, but it also became rather 
heavily export-oriented, including exports 
of manufactured products. Besides, the 
colonial imposed brutal repression and 
systemic control of the lower classes in 
both the cities and the countryside. The 
cumulative impact of these state-class 
configurations was to create a framework 
for the evolution of a high-growth 
political economy (Kohli, 1994). Eckert 
(1991) further asserts that there is a 
continuity between colonial and post-
colonial Korean economic structure, 
noting the common elements in both the 
development models: ‘the pivotal 
economic function of the state, the 
concentration of private economic power 
in the hands of a few large business 
groups or chaebol (zaibatsu in Japanese 
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terminology), the emphasis on exports, 
and the threat or actuality of war as a 
stimulus for economic growth. 
Conversely, some skeptics argue 
that amidst a claim of economic growth in 
the colonial Korea, the record was 
relatively modest. Furthermore, there 
were restrictions on indigenous business 
activity, limited employment opportunity 
in both public and private sectors for 
Koreans, agricultural surplus and 
investments were primarily directed to 
military rather than economic imperatives 
(Haggard, Kang, & Moon, 1997). There 
was a period gap between the end of 
Japanese rule and the beginning of 
Korea’s economic takeoff in which Korea 
suffered from fundamental policy change 
and war. Much of the Japanese-financed 
capital was destroyed during the war. 
Lastly, the Japanese involvement in the 
emergence of Korean firms and 
entrepreneurs in the interwar period is 
questionable. Some of the current chaebols, 
like Samsung and LG (formerly Lucky-
Goldstar), had ostensibly begun their 
operations during the Japanese rule 
(Breen, 1997). It is argued that irrespective 
of Japanese colonialization, such firms 
would have emerged, although the 
Korean acquisition of Japanese assets had 
contributed to the rise of some economic 
groups in the 1950s (Haggard, Kang, & 
Moon, 1997). 
Why does the Japanese legacy 
become so essential in discussing the 
Korean model of development? As a 
starter, it is necessary to understand the 
nature of Japanese colonization in Korea. 
Japan’s annexation policy toward Korea 
was driven by its desire to become the 
hegemonic power in the region by 
building a mighty military might with the 
supports from the annexed states (Kim K., 
2006). Thus, any ‘modernization’ policies 
and infrastructure built by the Japanese in 
the colonial Korea were selfishly 
motivated and most Koreans did not 
obtain any benefits from them (Kohli, 
1997). It can be argued that leaving vital 
resources to support the future 
development in Korea is not of the 
prudent intention of Japan when 
colonizing the peninsula but merely an 
‘unintended’ result of Japan’s expansionist 
policy. 
Before the Japanese annexation, 
Korea had been experiencing domestic 
instability due to some political riots as 
well as unequal agreements with foreign 
powers mainly Japan, China, the U.S., 
Germany, Russia, Italy, and France which 
resulted in weakening sovereignty of the 
country. These agreements significantly 
reduced Korea’s control over ports, 
railways, and many other vital assets. 
Besides, corruption had become the 
common practice of the government 
officials and rigid social structure 
widened the economic gap between the 
higher social class and the lower class that 
consequently fueled resentment by the 
commoners against the government. After 
the assassination of Queen Min in 1895 by 
the Japanese and their Korean followers, 
political unrests were culminated and 
fueled by the increasing Japanese 
domination following the murder. Russia 
took advantage of this situation by forcing 
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King Kojong to submit to the Russian 
legation in the hope that the foreign 
power can help deter the Japanese. 
However, after Japan’s victory over 
Russia, the Treaty of Portsmouth assured 
Japan effective supremacy in Korea. 
Furthermore, the Agreements of 17 
November 1905 and 24 July 1907 
arbitrarily gave the Japanese government 
the rights to interfere in Korea’s domestic 
affairs signaling the beginning of Japanese 
occupation (Kleiner, 2001).  
Kohli (1994) argues the 
‘modernization’ experience was the most 
plausible – if not instrumental – legacy of 
the Japanese colonialism. Korean 
capitalism learned from the provided 
framework established during the 
colonialization. The colonial power 
emphasis on building not only military 
and police forms of control but also the 
development of the peninsula under 
strong state auspices is a particularly 
instrumental lesson for the future Korean 
developmental elite. Japan had brought 
the access to modern technology and 
management. Managerial practices were 
changed in agriculture, industry, 
transportation, and government. For 
instance, Japanese government's 
deliberate promotion of modern 
agricultural practices such as irrigation, 
improved seeds, and the use of fertilizer 
had pushed productivity growth in 
colonial Korea (rice production rate of 2% 
per annum) (Kohli, 1994). Japan also 
introduced and utilized the “mighty trio” 
formula of the developmental state which 
is a coalition of the state bureaucratic 
organization, central banks, and zaibatsu 
conglomerates to industrialize Korea and 
parts of Manchuria (Cumings, 1984). 
Japan also located various heavy 
industries – steel, chemicals, hydro-
electric power – in Korea and built an 
extensive network of railways in Korea 
(Cumings, 1984). However, much of those 
infrastructures were destroyed during the 
Korean War. 
Japanese imperialism differs from 
its Western counterpart in several 
fundamental respects. Japan always 
sought to exercise a more intensive form 
of control over its colonies than European 
powers and to integrate its colonies into 
its economic structures. To facilitate 
economic exploitation and political 
control, the Japanese constructed a highly 
repressive, efficient, modern state in 
Korea. It exercised a pervasive and highly 
intensive form of control over all aspects 
of social and economic life in Korea (Piric, 
2008). Japan distorted the structure of 
Korean society by replacing Confucian 
and other indigenous teachings into a 
disciplined colonial bureaucracy 
education. Other influences of the 
Japanese colonialization to the Korean 
education include large-size classes, a 
heavy emphasis on academic – rather than 
vocational – studies, moral education, 
deep respect for the authority of the 
teacher and a government-managed 
system of examinations for entrance to the 
high school and university (Mason, 1980). 
It has been argued that the Japanese 
transformed a relatively corrupt and 
ineffective traditional state into a modern 
one that was capable of transforming the 
society. One could argue that the Japanese 
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Empire had significant contribution in 
liberating Koreans from the backwardness 
and stagnation, in which Koreans were 
otherwise unable to generate political and 
economic change (Palais, 1995). However, 
Eckert (1996) asserts that the 
authoritarianism that for decades 
epitomized South Korean politics after the 
Korean War owed much to the political 
character of the various Korean elites 
generated during the late-colonial period. 
Political Leadership of Park Chung Hee 
(1961-1979) and South Korean 
Developmental State 
Following the end of World War II, 
the relationship between the two countries 
develops in an intricate pattern. Japan and 
Korea (North and South) were engulfed in 
the post-war political realm as the world 
entered the tumultuous Cold War period. 
Korea was divided into the communist 
North and the ‘nominally’ liberal 
democratic South. Meanwhile, Japan 
began its pacifism era in which it 
drastically diminished any armed forces 
with war potentials. In the wake of 
Korean War (1950-1953), Japan and South 
Korea were awkwardly unified under the 
security patronization of the United States 
and inherently be an integral part of the 
global political contestation between the 
superpowers. South Korea and Japan had 
connected another link in their future 
where both countries are to prepare to 
enter the battlefield side to side, 
regardless their past chronicle, if the truce 
with North Korea is broken. 
In the immediate aftermath of 
Korean War, South Korea evidenced the 
fall of Syngman Rhee, an anti-communist 
independence figure who was elected as 
South’s first president, due to the 
widespread discontent of his iron-hand 
and corrupt government. A nation-wide 
protest eventually took place but was 
responded by police shooting which led to 
a subsequent chaotic mass riot. Rhee was 
ultimately ousted and replaced by Yun 
Bo-Seon as the President and Chang 
Myeon as Prime Minister. Despite the exit 
of Rhee, the political and economic 
instability persisted which provided a 
political opportunity for the military coup 
d’état, carried out by Park Chung Hee in 
1961. Park was a high-rank military officer 
who had long initiated the establishment 
of the Military Revolutionary Committee 
within the military corps to plan the coup. 
The coup brought Park into power, and 
the subsequent approval and official 
recognition from the United States gave 
him the legitimate leadership status after 
that. Under Park administration, South 
Korea experienced a ‘miraculous’ 
modernization that turned the country 
from one of the poorest one in the world 
into one of the global economic 
powerhouses. 
Essentially, Park Chung Hee has a 
significant Japanese influence in his life. 
Park Chung Hee had the primary 
education at Kumi Elementary School and 
Taegu Normal School, both of them using 
the Japanese educational system. There is 
a notion of Park Chung Hee being a cold 
and self-centered realist. It was reflected 
in his elementary school days where he 
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always carefully calculated his strategy 
and enjoyed exercising the authority given 
to him. He also had a great attraction to 
soldiering since a very young age. After 
spent some years becoming a teacher in 
Munkyong, he got a chance to be an army 
by receiving Japanese military education 
in Japanese-occupied Manchuria and 
Imperial Japanese Army Academy for 
several years. This Japanese experience 
was seen as a vital component in the 
character of Park’s future rule. Not only 
was he exposed to Japanese military 
planning, but he and his fellow Korean 
officers were imbued with the Japanese 
attitude of placing the interests of the 
group and nation before personal or 
family interest. In this sense, they were 
much less typically Korean than the 
preceding generations. Even after he 
became the President of South Korea, he 
still showed the mentality and behavior of 
a Japanese (Breen, 1997).  
It was observed that Park Chung 
Hee, mentally, was obliged to think 
“Japanese,” by devoting to the Yamato 
spirit of “one hundred million hearts 
beating as one,” and giving the loyalty 
and self-sacrifice to the emperor (Kim H.-
A., 2004). Park Chung Hee was even 
accused of being a pro-Japanese due to his 
action of submitting the Oath of 
Allegiance demonstrating his devotion to 
the Japanese Empire (Hankyoreh, 2009). 
Park was also seen as having the ambition 
to reinvent his identity as a ‘victorious’ 
Japanese Army officer. Within just three 
months of being in the army, Park 
voluntarily Japanized his name to Takaki 
Masao. It was described that Park Chung 
Hee looked like a Japanese soldier from 
the way he sat and stood to his actions 
characterized by his accuracy, speed, 
decisiveness and his action-oriented based 
character. Park graduated from the 
military academy with an excellent record 
and the Emperor of Manchuria Henry P’u-
Yi awarded Park a gold watch for his 
academic excellence (Kim H.-A., 2004). 
There are some policies and 
development strategies imposed by Park 
Chung Hee demonstrating the significant 
influence of his Japanese experience. Had 
it not been Park Chung Hee, it could be 
unlikely for South Korea to adopt the 
Japanese developmental state model to an 
unprecedented degree. The most 
fundamental policy was the normalization 
of South Korea-Japan relations in 1965 in 
exchange for Japanese aid and investment. 
By February 1964, just a little over a 
month after Park’s presidential 
inauguration on 27 December 1963, 
normalization talks between Japan and 
Korea began. Normalization of Korea’s 
relations with Japan had also been part of 
the US policy from 1947 as part of the US 
containment strategy, which was designed 
to make Japan a partner in the Cold War 
against communism. The US policy 
regarding normalizing Korea-Japan 
relations demonstrates a shift from 
demilitarization and democratization 
toward economic rehabilitation to create a 
dominant anti-communist force in North-
East Asia. In contrast to Syngman Rhee’s 
anti-Japanese stance, Park Chung Hee 
made a bold move to support this 
normalization idea. He visited Japan’s 
Prime Minister Ikeda in Tokyo in 
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November 1961 and talked not only with 
Ikeda but also many Japanese business 
leaders. Although Park’s primary interest 
was economic, this move shows his 
flexibility in dealing with Japanese 
compared to the former regimes.  
Park Chung Hee was seen to be 
greatly inspired by the Meiji Restoration’s 
principle that emphasizes the need of 
economic development to strengthen the 
military in order to resist the potential 
threat (fukoku kyohei). Park’s 
“Administrative Democracy” or 
“Koreanized Democracy” was the public 
rationale for his military-style 
administration, which, he claimed, was 
necessary to root out the past and to 
construct a new generation of national 
leadership comprising former military 
officers, technical engineers and other 
experts with professional qualifications 
(Kim H.-A., 2004). Park Chung Hee 
mentioned that: 
“I want to emphasize, and re-
emphasize, that the key factor of the 
May 16 Military Revolution was to 
effect an industrial revolution in 
Korea…I must again emphasize that 
without economic reconstruction, 
there would be no such things as 
triumph over Communism or 
attaining independence.” (Park Chung 
Hee) (Kim H.-A. , 2004) 
This statement demonstrates how 
the potential threat from the North drives 
the economic development view of the 
South Korean leader. His regime rejected 
the use of force against North Korea and 
instead stressed the need to build national 
strength and security through economic 
modernization. In this manner, Park 
wished to win over the communist in the 
North.  
The ‘mighty trio’ formula of 
Japan’s Meiji was replicated during Park 
Chung Hee regime with the presence of 
the Economic Planning Board (EPB), 
state’s control over the nationalized 
banking system, and the role of the 
chaebol. Only months after he assumed 
power, Park nationalized the banking 
system and controlled 96,4% of the 
country financial assets by 1970 (Luedde-
Neurath, 1988). Economic planning was 
taken seriously in South Korea during 
Park Chung Hee administration where he 
set up the Economic Planning Board 
(EPB), the Ministry of Finance, and the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry as the 
core economic bureaucracies. These 
ministries held the responsibility to 
combine the budgetary and planning 
powers and had tremendous power over 
economic decision-making (Haggard, 
Kim, & Moon, 1991). Organized business 
groups are regularly consulted on matters 
affecting the private sector, but it is 
evident that such groups exercise no 
influence on the country’s decision-
making (Mason, 1980). Institutions are 
structured to facilitate this participation, 
and there is ample testimony that 
President Park and his economic 
secretariat in the Blue House were fully 
engaged in the process. Park subjugated 
bureaucrats under his grip and dictated 
virtually every policy detail (Moon & 
Prasad, 1994).  
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The South Korean pattern of 
development has a strong sense of 
nationalism on it which demonstrates 
another similar pattern with the 
fundamental factor driving the Meiji 
restoration. While the threat of Western 
invasion ostensibly drove the Meiji 
regime’s modernization policy, South 
Korea’s economic development was 
defined to address the threat from the 
North. Unlike Western companies, whose 
raison d’etre is to increase the wealth of 
their shareholders, Korean firms were 
substantially established and existed for 
nation-building. Thus, Korea appeared to 
be a capitalist country on the surface, 
whereas on the inside its practices and 
attitudes made it look much more socialist 
(Breen, 1997). It was during the Park 
Chung Hee regime that business 
conglomeration structure (chaebol) gained 
its momentum. Park particularly wanted 
firms that could compete internationally 
with the Japanese. He thought that, as 
Koreans were not hard workers, and, as 
businesspeople and politicians were 
corrupt, a few loyal and capable 
lieutenants would be more effective than 
the vast army of small and medium 
business people. There was a risk that the 
development of large, powerful groups 
could provide power bases for ambitious 
tycoons to challenge his authority. 
However, Park Chung Hee thought he 
was able to control the chaebol with his 
hard authoritarian and militaristic 
approach (Breen, 1997).  
Another similarity between Park 
Chung Hee’s strategy and the Meiji 
regime was the use of Western economic 
and technological advance without 
necessarily adopting the Western model of 
development. The developed West, in 
general, was crucial to the Koreans for its 
technological import. Korean growth was 
possible because Korean workers were 
cheap and disciplined, and educated 
enough to learn how to use or copy 
foreign machines (Breen, 1997). Although 
independence is the main emphasis in 
Park Chung Hee’s idea of economic 
development, he understood the 
importance of the alliance with the U.S. 
for Korea’s growth. The U.S. government 
provided a security shield against possible 
renewed conflict with North Korea, and a 
market for Korean products. There have 
been tensions and difficulties, but the 
benefit to Korea was that it was both in 
American strategic interest and a natural 
consequence of American values as a 
nation born in opposition to imperialism, 
that its client state grows economically 
and politically from near-total 
dependency to equal partnership.  
Ultimately, following the path of 
the Meiji government on extinguishing the 
corrupt Tokugawa rule, Park Chung Hee 
also had been enforcing the resurrection of 
Korean national character, primarily those 
in support of economic development since 
the national character on his view was – to 
some extent – had been polluted during 
the Choson Dynasty era, the last dynasty 
of Korea prior to the Japanese annexation. 
During his presidency, Park Chung Hee 
was known as a supporter of anti-elitist 
and anti-populist ideals, which were 
manifested in the self-restrained and 
disciplinary atmosphere (Han, 2004). Park 
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was one of the most financially disciplined 
dictators in history showed his strictness 
in handling political funds in an attempt 
to prevent corruption, especially within 
the elite circle. Immediately after taking 
power, he launched an anti-corruption 
campaign. 
Reflection on Indonesia’s Past and 
Present 
South Korea’s developmental state 
model somewhat mirrors Indonesia’s 
experience during the New Order regime 
led by Suharto (1967-1998). Both Park 
Chung Hee and General Suharto had a 
military background and rose into power 
through a military coup in around the 
same period. Suharto’s regime, dubbed as 
the New Order, also combined a 
successful economy-first policy with hard 
authoritarianism and harsh internal 
repression. Upon assuming power, 
Suharto deliberately abandoned his 
predecessor’s confrontational policy 
against Malaysia and instead formed the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) in 1967 with the former enemy. 
Furthermore, he sought rapprochement 
with Japan, Indonesia’s former colonial. 
Indonesia experienced remarkable 
economic growth and development 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
Industrialization was undertaken by 
conglomerates, mostly of Chinese-
Indonesian descendants, who dominated 
the nation’s economy even until now. 
Suharto was consolidating both his power 
over the army and bureaucracy and the 
Indonesian developmental state by 
winning over support or buying off 
opposition (Leftwich, 1995). However, this 
strategy consequently provided a fertile 
ground for the high-level corruption 
which contributed to the regime’s 
downfall in the late 1990s. Following the 
economic crisis in 1998, the regime was 
unable to sustain the domestic political 
unrest and the wave of democratization 
which subsequently ended the regime 31-
year rule.  
Amidst demonstrating similar 
patterns, Indonesia failed to reach South 
Korea’s level of modernization. It can be 
argued that Indonesia has lost the 
momentum to modernize the country due 
to the regime’s inability to control 
corruption and sustain the emerging 
domestic political forces. The question is 
whether the developmental state is still 
relevance in the current political and 
economic context? Indonesia’s bitter 
experience with the authoritarian regime 
makes it difficult to maintain the old 
developmental state model which imposes 
the authoritarian political system. In a 
democracy, civil society and business 
sectors are more willing to criticize the 
government policy or challenge it. 
Moreover, greater trade and financial 
integration with other countries can 
hinder the state from taking full control 
over the state’s economic process and 
financial assets. However, Hayashi (2010) 
argues that the developmental state is not 
necessarily extinct. The developmental 
state in the era of globalization needs to 
accommodate the global market 
strategically while maintaining the 
proactive role of the state. To achieve this 
trajectory, according to the developmental 
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state formula, the political leadership 
should be assumed by determined 
developmental elite with a visionary 
economic orientation. 
Conclusion 
Despite its hatred and negative 
sentiments toward Japan due to the 
colonization experience, South Korea 
seems to adopt the Japanese model of 
development. This condition is 
contradictive with what South Korea was 
expected to do if it considers this 
negativity. With its close ally with the 
United States, there was a high possibility 
that South Korea could adopt the Western 
model of development instead of the 
Japanese one. As we could see that the 
main difference between the Japanese and 
Western model can be seen in the level of 
the state’s role in the development 
process. While the Western model 
supports the market rational with less 
interference from the state, Japanese 
model implements a developmental state 
model in which the state holds effective 
control over the development process. By 
referring to the political leadership 
element within the developmental state 
concept, I argue that the role of Park 
Chung Hee is instrumental in South 
Korea’s adoption of the Japanese 
developmental state model. Had it not 
been Park Chung Hee, it would be 
unlikely to happen. Park Chung Hee was 
a central figure that could make this 
paradoxical condition plausible due to his 
Japanese linkage and his trajectory about 
South Korea’s modernization in its 
conjunction with the threat from North 
Korea. 
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